Chapters of the training course "and the formation of the new European civilization." Solovyov E.Yu.: morality, law, rule of law, I

Articles

2018

« Bless your blue eye." Cosmopersonalism and the Historiosophical Irony of Maximilian Voloshin// M.A. Voloshin: pro et contra, anthology./ Comp., entry. article, comment. T.A. Koshemchuk. - St. Petersburg: TsSO, 2017 - 800 p. - (Russian Way). M11. ISBN 978-5906623-12-16. pp. 425-438.

2017

. Part II // Philosophical Journal. 2017. V. 10. No. 3. S. 5-31. DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2017-10-3-5-31

The article is a historical and philosophical study that explains the original interpretation of the relationship between philosophy and ideology, which was born during the “Moscow philosophical thaw” and was picked up by Russian philosophers of the sixties. The neo-Marxist theory of thinking, worked out by E.V. Ilyenkov, and the neo-Marxist theory of consciousness, stated by M.K. Mamardashvili. The author sees the similarity and semantic relationship of these concepts: in the use of the concept of "ideology" exclusively in the meaning of pejorative (judgmental-negative term); in the same type of understanding of “ideal” (Ilyenkov) and “form” (Mamardashvili); in the thorough thinking through by both of them of the problems of illusions, objective appearances, "objective mental forms" and "transformed forms". Ilyenkov and Mamardashvili are not just in a multifaceted roll call with each other. Both of them also have something in common with Kant as the author of the article "The Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?". An analysis of this “over-temporal co-authorship” makes it possible to see that the struggle to free people from the power of ideologies cannot be successful (a) without a radical restructuring of education and (b) without a philosophical enlightenment freed from the flaws and one-sidedness of enlightenment.

Philosophy as a critique of ideologies . Part I // Philosophical Journal. 2016. V. 9. No. 4. S. 5-17. DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2016-9-4-5-17

The article deals with the relationship between philosophy and ideology in the context of information warfare. It is characterized by the phenomenon of mirror ideological symmetry, when the same type of sophistry and casuistry are used on both sides of the semantic conflict. The mobilization of mass audiences, ensured by mirror ideological symmetry, is subject to two main intentions: (a) warning and (b) project inspiration. The effect of warning is achieved by inciting pre-emptive distrust, creating an "image of the enemy", inventive compromising evidence and planting a cult of vigilance. The typical discourse of ideological warnings is a "collage of disparate information flashes", allowing for the loss of logical memory and logical lack of conscience. The author proposes to turn to the very discursiveness of speech and the logical protection of consciousness and thinking by means of logical-linguistic analysis. Inspiring projects quite accurately correspond to the concept of mission and continue to this day, fraught with the danger of geopolitical myths, ethnic intolerance and revived historicist speculations. According to the author, the philosophical response to these ideological threats should be a culture of skeptical verification of expectations and hopes, a strict distinction between the program and the ideal (target) and further development of the concept of open history.

The center of education at Chistye Prudy// Question. philosophy. 2017. No. 7. P.132-136.

2016

The history of philosophy in the register of journalism// History of philosophy in the format of the article / Comp. and resp. ed. Yu.V. Blue-eyed. Moscow: Cultural Revolution, 2016, pp. 71-109.

2014- 2015

The Category of the Crowd in Lermontov's Poetic Thinking // Problems of Russian Self-Consciousness: M.Yu. Lermontov's Worldview. Materials of the 11th All-Russian Conf. October 2014. Moscow-Penza-Tarkhany / Ed. S.A. Nikolsky. M.: IF RAN, 2015. S. 103-121.
History of Philosophy as a Museum and Theater // History of Philosophy: Challenges of the 21st Century. Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference / Ed. N.V. Motroshilova. M.: Kanon+, 2014. S. 41-46.
Historical and philosophical journalism (signs and requirements) // Philosophy and Culture. 2014. No. 5 (77). pp. 731-744.
On the culture of benevolence (Kant and Tolstoy's commandment to love one's neighbor) // Problems of Philosophy of Culture. Issue. 2. M.: IF RAN. 2014. S. 62-93.

“God forbid I go crazy...” (the maxim of the self-preservation of the mind in the anthropology of Kant) // Historical and Philosophical Yearbook 2011. M .: Kanon +, 2012. P. 205-232.
The tragedy of beauty in the book of K. Kantor "Beauty and Benefit" // Questions of Philosophy. 2012. No. 12. S. 177-188.
Graves of Marxists at the cemetery of Russian writers // Duty and Love. Collection of philological works in honor of the 65th anniversary of Professor M. V. Mikhailova. Articles, reviews, essays. M.: Krug, 2012. S. 14-19.
Translation from German: Jurgen Habermas. The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights (Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie. 2010. Hft. 3. S. 343-356) // Questions of Philosophy. 2012. No. 2. S. 66-80.
Philosophical and legal depths of Chekhov's story "Intruder" // Philosophy and Culture. 2011. No. 6. S. 87-98.
Antinomies of Justice in Chekhov's Fiction // Problems of Russian Self-Consciousness: A.P. Chekhov's Worldview. Materials of the Seventh All-Russian Conference. Moscow-Rostov, 2011. S. 23-34.
Ethics of non-violence and the problem of legal nihilism // Problems of Russian identity: Philosophy of Leo Tolstoy. Materials of the Sixth All-Russian Conference. Moscow-Tula, 2011. S. 14-27.
About stereotyped prejudices in the interpretation of the genesis and meaning of human rights // Philosophy in the Dialogue of Cultures. Materials of World Philosophy Day (November 2009). M.: Progress-Tradition, 2010. S. 136-154.
Antithetics of mass consciousness // Opening Grushin. M.: MGU, 2010. S. 129-139.
Kant for All Times // Philosophy and Ethics. Collection of scientific papers dedicated to the 70th anniversary of Academician A.A. Huseynov. M.: Alfa-M, 2009. S. 104-120.
Merab Mamardashvili's existential soteriology // Merab Konstantinovich Mamardashvili [series Philosophy of Russia in the second half of the 20th century]. M.: ROSSPEN, 2009. S. 174-202.
Predestination and firm will in the theology of John Calvin // Philosophy and Culture. 2009. No. 10. S. 31-42.
Reformation and formation new European civilization// Vestnik RGNF. 2009. No. 1 (54). pp. 68-75.
Reformation as a civilizational "geological shift" // Beresten (philosophical and cultural almanac). 2009. No. 1 (3). pp. 79-87.
Man under interrogation (non-living, truthfulness and the right to silence) // Logos. Special issue. 2008. No. 5 (68). pp. 23-34.
Critical-verification function of philosophy // Actual problems through the prism of philosophy. CASE Yearbook. Issue. 2. Novgorod the Great. 2008. S. 77-89.
The second formula of the categorical imperative in the moral and legal teaching of Vl. Solovyov // Immanuel Kant: Heritage and Project / Ed. V.S. Stepina, N.V. Motroshilova. M., 2007. S. 550-558.
Self-consciousness against self-admiration // Problems of Russian Self-Consciousness: Proceedings of the 1st All-Russian Conference, Moscow-Orel, 2006 / Ed. S.A. Nikolsky. M.: IFRAN, 2007. S. 38-43.
Historical and philosophical research as an example of transcultural communication (review of the book: Ryskeldiev L.T. Deontology in the history of philosophy) // Almanac "Totallogy". Issue. 13. Kyiv, 2006 (0.6 a.l.).
Punitive justice and legal humanism // Justice and non-violence: Russian context. Veliky Novgorod: NovGU Publishing House, 2006 (2.5 a. l.).
The main patterns of the new European civilization: "workaholic", "professional", "entrepreneur", "human rights activist" // Website "Ethics: information resource" (ethicscenter.ru/solov-1). 2006 (1.6 a.l.).
I. Kant: an ethical response to the challenge of the era of secularization // Historical and Philosophical Yearbook "2004. M .: Nauka, 2005. P. 209-226.
Providence against fate // Philosophy and history of philosophy: actual problems. To the 90th anniversary of Academician T.I.Oizerman. M., 2004. S. 382-396.
Rethinking Talion. Punitive Justice and Legal Humanism // New World. 2004. No. 4. P. 123-143.
Secularization-historicism-Marxism (the theme of man-godism and the religion of progress in the philosophical journalism of S.N. Bulgakov // Forum of Recent Eastern European History and Culture. 2004. No. 2.
Moment of wildness (about human rights, justice and vodka) // Index: Dossier on censorship. 2003. No. 18.
Man-Godism and the Religion of Progress in S.N. Bulgakov's Publicism // Questions of Philosophy. 2002. No. 7.
Humanitarian and legal issues in the philosophical journalism of V.S. Solovyov // Solovyov collection. Proceedings of the international conference "V.S. Solovyov and his philosophical heritage" (Moscow, August 28-30, 2000) / Ed. I. Borisova and A. Kozyrev. M.: Phenomenology-Germenevtika, 2001. S. 29-51.
Secularization-historicism-Marxism: the theme of man-godism and the religion of progress in the philosophical journalism of S.N. Bulgakov // Problems of Philosophy. 2001. No. 4. S. 31-37.
The concept of law in Kant and Hegel (a look from Russian tradition and modernity) // The fate of Hegelianism: philosophy, religion and politics say goodbye to modernity / Ed. Peter Kozlowski and Erich Solovyov. M.: Respublika, 2000. S. 272-286.
Bless your blue eye . Cosmopersonalism and the Historiosophical Irony of Maximilian Voloshin// Russian magazine. 1998 (March).
Existential Soteriology of Merab Mamardashvili // Historical and Philosophical Yearbook "1998. M .: Nauka, 2000. P. 387-407.
Human rights in the political experience of Russia (contribution and lessons of the 20th century) // Reformatory ideas in the social development of Russia. Moscow: IFRAN. 1998, pp. 131-199.
Philosophical journalism of the sixties: conquests, seductions, unfinished business // Questions of Philosophy. 1997. No. 8 (reprinted in the book: How it was: Memories and Reflections / Edited by V.A. Lektorsky. M .: ROSSPEN. 2010).
Let me introduce myself // Ibid. No. 8. S. 68-71.
Tolerance as a New European Universal // Philosophical Dumka. Kyiv. No. 3-4. 1997.
Only after Vladimir Solovyov was Russian liberal thought able to acquire a programmatic consistency // Liberalism in Russia / Ed. V.F. Pustarnakov and I. Khudushina. M.: IF RAN, 1996.
Legal nihilism and the humanistic meaning of law // Quintessence: Philosophical Almanac. Moscow: Politizdat. 1990.
Individual, individuality, personality // Kommunist. 1988. No. 17. S. 50-63.
An attempt to substantiate a new philosophy of history in the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger // New trends in Western social philosophy. M.: IFAN (rotaprint), 1988. S. 11-50.
Moral and ethical issues in the "Critique of Pure Reason" // Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" and modernity / Ed. ed. V.A. Steinberg. Riga: Zinatne, 1984.
Biographical analysis as a type of historical and philosophical research // Questions of Philosophy. 1981. No. 7. S. 115-126. No. 9. S. 132-143.
Entrepreneurship and Patriotic Consciousness // Culture of Russian Entrepreneurship. M., 1977. S. 58-70.
The theory of "social contract" and Kant's moral justification of law // Kant's Philosophy and Modernity. M.: Thought, 1974.
Existentialism // Questions of Philosophy. 1966. No. 3. 1967. No. 1.

encyclopedias

Articles: "" (Kant), "On the slavery of the will" (Luther), Practical Reason // New Philosophical Encyclopedia: In 4 vols. M .: Thought, 2000-2001.

Articles in foreign languages

The Philosophical-Historical Views of Herzen as a Problem in the History of West European Philosophy // Russian Studies in Philosophy. Winter 2012-2013. Vol. 51. No 3. P. 83-95.
The Philosophical-Legal Depth of Chekhov's Story "A Malefactor". Philosophical Views of Leo Tolstoy and Anton Chekhov // Russian Studies in Philosophy. 2011 Vol. 50. No. 2. P. 70-82.
The Existential Soteriology of Merab Mamardashvili // Russian Studies in Philosophy. Vol. 49, no. 1 (Summer 2010). P. 53-73.
The Institute of Philosophy Has Long Been an Institution of Civil Society // Russian Studies in Philosophy. Vol. 48, no. 1. 2009. P. 83- 100.
Erich Ju. Solowjow. Die zweite Formel des kategorischen Imperativs in der moralisch-rechtlichen Lehre Wladimir Solowjows // Kant in Spiegel der russischen Kantforschung heute / Hrsg. von Nelly Motroschilowa and Norbert Hinske. Stuttgart; Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboorg, 2008. S. 145-152.
The Humanistic-Legal Problematic in Solov "ev" s Philosophical Journalism // Studies in East European Thought. Special Issue / Ed. by Evert van der Zweerde. Vol. 55, no. 2. 2003. P. 115-139.
Sekularisation-Historizismus-Marxismus. Menschgottum und Fortschrittreligion in der philosophischen Publizistik S.N. Bulgakovs // Das Christentum und die totalitä ren Herausforderunden des 20. Jahrhunderts: Rußland, Deutschland, Italien und Polen im Vergleich/ Hrsg. von Leonid Luks. K ö ln; Weimar; Vienna: B ö hlau Verlag, 2002. S. 89 - 101.
Der Begriff des Rechts bei Hegel und Kant // Die Folgen des Hegelianismus (Philosophie, Religion und Politik im Abschied von der Moderne / Hrsg. von Peter Koslowski. München: Wilhelm Fink, 1998.
Ethische Begrü ndung des Rechts bei Vladimir Solovi "ev // Russisches Denken im europaeischen Dialog / Hrsg. von Maria Deppermann. Innsbruck; Wien: Studien-Verlag, 1998. S. 311-318.
Law as Politians" Morality // Justice and Democracy: Cross-Cultural Approach. Honolulu, 1997.
Not a Forecast, but a Social Prophesy // Studies in East European Thought 45, no. 1- 2. P. 37 - 49.
Die Entstehung einer personalistischen Philosophie im heutigen Russland // Studies in Soviet Thought 44. 1992. P. 193- 201.

Translation from German

The era of religious wars, fragments of which were the first bourgeois revolutions (Dutch and English), led to a deep secularization of public consciousness. By the end XVII century religion has ceased to be the universal organizing form of the social cosmos. It has now become, on the one hand, an ideology in the narrow sense of the word; on the other hand, an inalienable personal faith, which only crudely and conditionally shapes itself in legalized confessions. This process was accompanied by an unprecedented ideological and moral crisis.

But a new value-normative system appeared - the system of legal consciousness, main components which became:

* heightened attention to the issues of distributive and punitive justice (to the implementation of the principle "to each his own" in the practice of authoritative arbitration decisions);
* development of contract ethics, that is, a culture of compliance with contracts, agreements, mutual obligations;
* the idea of inalienable rights-freedoms granted to everyone from birth.

All these ideas were born into the world as ethically significant, as new "moral absolutes" (Yu. N. Davydov). To observe justice, honor contracts, respect other people's freedom - they began to see this as unconditional, as it were, overtime requirements that oppose moral prescriptions warring faiths and are obligated to all without exception.

GM. Servetus, Castellion, L. and F. Socins, P. Sharron, M. Montaigne, R. Brown, W. Penn, P. Bayle found a universal normative language suitable for everyone and a mass of people who despaired of the philanthropy of each of the Christian denominations, spiritually revived thanks to the supra-confessional idea of human rights.

P. Ya. Chaadaev expressed this in his "First Philosophical Letter":

"Let superficial philosophy make as much noise as it likes about religious wars, bonfires kindled by intolerance - as far as we are concerned, we can only envy the fate of peoples who, in this clash of beliefs, in these bloody battles in defense of truth, have created for themselves a world of concepts such as we we can’t even imagine, let alone be transported there body and soul, as we claim to be.”

It was only in the 16th-17th centuries that a real sense of justice appeared for the first time, in its difference from morality, from religious judgments about the forbidden and sinful.

It was a great job which included:

* substantiation of the concept of private property;
* contractual interpretation of powers state power;
* a radical rethinking of the concept of "natural law" (John Locke).

Locke turned out to be a great interpreter of the emerging legal consciousness, able to fix and express such attitudes of it, which not only retained their social effectiveness throughout the entire 18th century, but in a certain sense turned out to be “eternal” in general.

When creating the political and legal doctrine, Locke worked primarily as a philosopher-analyst, expressing in a clear language of reason such evidence that implicitly already subjugated the actual political consciousness. According to Marx, Locke's essay on the origin human mind was greeted as "a long and passionately expected guest." And reading in the XVII-XVIII centuries of his four letters on religious tolerance and two treatises on government was accompanied by the maximum effect of recognizing what was already in the air and implied.

Marx put it this way: Locke "represented the new bourgeoisie in all its forms as opposed to feudalism."

In the philosophical and legal theory, Locke was the first to express civil law ideal. Locke's state-legal theory turns out to be a philosophical and conceptual construction, through which the revolutions of the XVI-XVII are replaced by bourgeois-democratic revolutions.

Locke's construction of "natural law""- this is no longer just a system of theoretical postulates of the existing state-legal order, but a direct declaration of "inalienable rights." The constitutional practice of the North American states, their famous bills of rights, are directly based on Locke's teachings. Locke is the first philosopher who participated in drawing up the founding state act: he wrote a constitution for the North. Carolina in 1669.

It can be said that Locke's teaching for the first time divined and analytically clarified the bourgeois-democratic legislative will.

Early bourgeois interpretation of equality

The living subject of law and order in Locke is an individual seeking private gain. The "state of nature" (Locke's 2nd treatise on government) is first and foremost a state of "fair" competition based on mutual recognition.

"Natural Law" is understood by Locke primarily as a requirement of equal partnership: nature prescribes that each individual accept the other as a free and independent counterparty competing with him in the field of seeking benefits.

Equality and freedom, which are included in Locke's interpretation of the "state of nature" and "natural law", are commodity-exchange relations. It is about equality of opportunity and aspirations.

The bottom line is that not one of the individuals, no matter how scarce his natural wealth, can be excluded from competition, cut off from the free exchange of goods and services.

Paradoxical the idea of "equality without equalization"", equality, allowing for the natural dissimilarity of people.

In his treatise On the Citizen, Hobbes outlined one of the main modes of "natural law" as follows:

"... each must represent a benefit to the others. In order to understand this, one must pay attention to the fact that in the formation of societies among people there are differences in abilities."

A. Smith: it is only through exchange that the natural differences of individuals become socially significant, and the individuals themselves become equally worthy in their limitations and peculiarities.

The "Triple Formula" of Civil Rights

In "Treatise on Government" Locke formulates three basic innate rights of individuals and which individuals recognize one after another in the "state of nature" and which are then guaranteed by the state itself: this right to life, liberty and property.

These three rights form, according to Locke, the constitutional basis of the legal order and for the first time make possible legislation that is not restrictive, but emancipatory in its basic meaning.

Locke's triple legal formula (freedom, life, property) was included in many early bourgeois constitutions and was a "cell" from which a more differentiated content of "human and civil rights" then developed.

The rights indicated in Locke's "triple formula" reflect into each other: freedom in the narrow sense of the word and the right to life are, as such, the right to property, because they assume that the individual is the owner of his goals and vitality.

And vice versa, the right to property and the right to life are already, as such, the essence of freedom, for they provide scope for the realization of the same will that expresses itself in the choice of vocation, in the setting of goals, in an unfettered conscience and word.

1. Ownership. Includes the right to life and liberty and often appears in the text of Locke's treatise as the most general designation political and legal status of the individual. "The great and chief object of the association of men into states, and by them putting themselves under the power of the government," declares Locke, is the preservation of their property.

Velika the role of labor

Locke's idea of the origin of all property from labor, however naive it may be, is not just a delusion.

Firstly, it expresses an illusion that becomes true under certain exceptional ("ideal") conditions for the organization of economic practice.

Secondly, this thought, erroneous as a judgment about the actual facts of economic history, nevertheless contains an element of normative truth.

It was the positing of labor as the basis of all private ownership that allowed Locke to merge together the three basic innate rights of the individual.

2. Work aimed at achieving individual well-being and benefits is recognized by Locke as the defining form of human life, which primarily means the right to life.

This right, as Locke interprets it, cannot be reduced to a mere prohibition of murder.

For Locke, it is self-evident that the true right to life exists only where society consists of economically independent producers, some of whom (under the pressure of "needs and circumstances", and not because of someone else's compulsion) temporarily sell themselves into work. Under any other social conditions, life, strictly speaking, is no longer guaranteed.

Life is reduced by Locke to an activity subordinated to happiness and profit as the inalienable personal goals of each individual.

3. From this, the inner connection that exists between this right and the last member of Locke's "triple formula" becomes understandable, namely, freedom in the narrow sense of the word.

Freedom, Locke explains, exists where everyone is recognized as "the owner of his own personality."

But this right also has its own deep content. The point is that in a reasonable society, no person can be a slave, vassal or servant of the state itself. (Locke against despotism and theocracy)

In addition, Locke considers doubtful any declaration of the right to property and the right to life, which is not based on guarantees of free individual self-determination.

People cannot in fact be either full owners of their property or independent commodity producers unless they are guaranteed freedom of conscience. More than his works, An Essay on the Law of Nature, and the famous Letter on Toleration make this assertion quite clear.

"An experiment on the law of nature": a utilitarian reduction of ethics, the right of a person to independently navigate problems related to his pleasure and suffering, benefit and harm. Any attempt to decide for the individual what is beneficial for him and what is detrimental is morally untenable.

This most important setting of "Experience ..." echoes the central idea "Letters on Tolerance"", one of the works of the 17th century, where the principle of tolerance is brought to a direct defense of freedom of conscience and the separation of church and state.

Locke writes: "No one can be forced to be rich or healthy against his will"; In the same sense, it must be recognized that "The care of one's own soul belongs to every man and must be left to him...

“I affirm,” writes Locke, “that the power of the sovereign does not reach the establishment of the truths of faith and forms of worship by the power of his laws. For laws are powerless without punishment, and punishments in this case are absolutely intolerable, because they are not able to convince the soul .. Only light and evidence can contribute to a change in opinion." And further: "Not differences of opinion that cannot be avoided, but the rejection of tolerance towards those who hold a different opinion, gave rise to all the quarrels and wars that were in the Christian world ...".

The acquisition of faith is for Locke an intimate and inherently personal process..

An unconstrained conscience forms the basis of all rights. Faith projects itself with goals, goals are realized in the enterprise (labor), labor is embodied in property.

This picture, if it is understood as a depiction of a real socio-economic phenomenon, does not take into account the permanent alienation of property from labor under the conditions of class society.

The matter, however, will look different if the same picture is interpreted as the assertion of a certain norm and model.

Only that activity is worthy of the name "labor" which rests on independent judgment, choice and goal-setting. Locke was the first to see in freedom of conscience an elementary condition, the observance of which alone makes labor itself personal labor.

Locke's "Natural Law" formulated a new political and legal ideal: the ideal of society, in in which each person is recognized from the outset as an independent worker-owner.

Most importantly, Locke's discovery deep semantic unity of all rights-freedoms.

Locke's concept of natural law is opposed not only to feudal socio-political views, but also to the way of thinking generally characteristic of pre-capitalist societies. It requires from the state not just "wise guardianship over subjects," not just paternal care and a rational combination of "general benefit with private." It puts at the forefront respect for the capacity and civic independence of the individual.

Solovyov E.Yu.

The Locke Phenomenon

The era of religious wars, fragments of which were the first bourgeois revolutions (Dutch and English), led to a deep secularization of public consciousness. By the end XVII centuries, a comprehensive scholastic-theological belief no longer had authority for reason, and religion itself ceased to be a universal organizing form of the social cosmos. It has now become, on the one hand, an ideology in the narrow sense of the word, that is, a more or less rationalized doctrinal-dogmatic complex, in each case serving special and specific state, coalition or class interests; on the other hand, an inalienable personal faith, which only crudely and conditionally shapes itself in legalized confessions. This process was accompanied by an unprecedented ideological and moral crisis: the devaluation of traditional patriarchal customs and detailed moral and prescriptive codes that each specific religion put forward in opposition to each other. Lost credibility are abstract religious declarations of altruism, compassion, and mercy, too often a tool of hypocrisy.

And yet, Western European society did not fall into the swamp of unscrupulousness. The moral crisis was accompanied by the birth and strengthening of a new value-normative system - the system of legal consciousness, the main components of which were:

a) heightened attention to the issues of distributive and punitive justice (to the implementation of the principle "to each his own" in the practice of authoritative arbitration decisions);

b) the development of contract ethics, that is, a culture of compliance with treaties, agreements, mutual obligations (“veksel honesty,” as the ideologue of Slavophilism K. S. Aksakov once put it with irony worthy of a better application);

c) the idea of inalienable rights-freedoms granted from birth to every human individual.

All these ideas were born as ethically significant, as new "moral absolutes", to use the terminology widely debated today by Yu. N. Davydov. To observe justice, to honor treaties, to respect other people's freedom - they began to see this as unconditional, as it were, overtime requirements that oppose the moral prescriptions of warring faiths and are obligated to all authorities without exception, not excluding the heavenly master.

The crucible in which an ethically selfless sense of justice was forged was XVII century struggle for freedom of conscience. "Apostles of religious tolerance" (M. Servet, Castellion, L. and F. Socins, P. Charron, M. Montaigne, R. Brown, W. Peny, P. Bayle) found a universal normative language suitable for all developing human rights movements, starting with the burgher municipal ones, ending with the free trade ones. The mass of people, despairing of the philanthropy of each of the Christian denominations, spiritually revived thanks to the supra-confessional idea of human rights.

If it is permissible to say that only with Galileo - Newton did science begin in the proper sense of the word; that it was only in the easel painting and non-temple sculpture of the late Renaissance that art as such was first constituted; that only after W. Petty does a genuine political and economic analysis arise, then with even greater reason it can be argued that only in XVI - XVII centuries, for the first time, real legal consciousness is born in its difference from morality, from religious judgment about the forbidden and sinful, as well as from simple reflection into a cash (decree-prohibitive or decree-permissive) law.

It is this new form of normative consciousness that is being systematically deployed by pioneering philosophers. XVII century, turning into theoretical legal understanding and civilized political science. Central to this grandiose work, which included:

a) substantiation of the concept of private property as a necessary prerequisite for distributive justice;

b) contractual interpretation of the powers of state power;

c) a radical rethinking of the concept of "natural law",

belonged to the English philosopher John Locke.

In historical and philosophical concepts XIX Over the centuries, Locke has often qualified as a typical representative of the “innovations of yesterday,” that is, such theoretical ideas that, without having had time to be covered with a venerable patina, turned into common platitudes of sanity. There were reasons for this. The empirical-inductive methodology developed by Locke and the theory of the formation of abstractions really belonged entirely to XVII - early XVIII century. They retained their strength and significance only as long as their direct opponent, the scholastics, was alive.

The latter, however, cannot be said about Locke's political and legal doctrine. Locke turned out to be a great interpreter of the nascent sense of justice, able to fix and express his attitudes, which not only retained their social effectiveness throughout XVIII centuries, but in a certain sense turned out to be "eternal" in general. Locke's political and legal judgments can neither grow old nor die out until the institutions of civil society, the beginning of constitutionalism and the separation of powers, are established throughout the world; until the concept of human rights ceases to develop and exert its normalizing influence on socio-political practice.

When creating the political and legal doctrine, Locke only small degree followed his empirical-inductive methodology. In this area, he worked primarily as a philosopher-analyst, expressing in a clear language of reason such evidence that implicitly already subjugated the actual political consciousness and (at least in England) determined the semantics of ordinary language. It can be said, therefore, that in Locke's political philosophy, the very new European legal consciousness, suffered through hardships during the period of religious wars, appeared as a phenomenon, that is, as "a phenomenon that reveals itself, interprets and explicates itself in a rationally understandable way" (E. Husserl) .

According to Marx, Locke's essay on the origin of the human mind was received as a "long and eagerly awaited guest." But, perhaps, with even greater justification, this can be said about four letters on religious tolerance and two treatises on state government. Their reading in XVII - XVIII centuries was accompanied by the maximum effect of recognition, a clear comprehension of what was already in the air and implied. Only a thinker who, firstly, perfectly mastered the art of analytical interpretation, and secondly, was close enough to the early bourgeois ideological movement, could achieve such an effect.

In the language of class-ideological analysis, Marx put it this way: Locke represented the new bourgeoisie in all its forms, he was the classic exponent of the legal ideas of bourgeois society as opposed to feudalism.

In Locke's philosophical and legal theory, for the first time, that civil-legal ideal expressed itself, which was objectively requested by the era and by proclaiming which the rising bourgeoisie could only secure the role of a general democratic leader.

It is not at all accidental that among the prominent political figures of the period under review, we only rarely meet the followers of G. Grotius, Spinoza or Hobbes (the pre-Locquean philosophy of law, for all its theoretical significance, is still far from any real social and political influence). Conversely, in the political arena XVIII centuries - many convinced Lockians (such, for example, Jefferson and Franklin, Sieyes and Brissot). Locke's state-legal theory turns out to be a philosophical-conceptual construction, through which revolutions XVI - XVII centuries pass on their bitter experience to the era of victorious bourgeois-democratic upheavals.

Locke's construction of "natural law" is no longer just a system of theoretical postulates intended (as in Spinoza and Hobbes) to explain what was found, the existence of an existing state-legal order in its "true reality". This is a direct declaration of "inalienable rights", the totality of which is conceived as the basic law of the newly established (reasonable) social order. The constitutional practice of the North American states, their famous bills of rights, are directly based on Locke's teaching. Locke was the first philosopher in history to participate in the drafting of the founding state act: on the recommendation of Shaftesbury, he wrote a constitution for the North. Carolina, which in 1669 was approved by the assembly of people's representatives and entered into force.

Although the constitutional project proposed by Locke did not belong to the number of radical documents of early bourgeois law-making (in many respects it was lower even than the principles that the philosopher himself defended in the second “Treatise on State Government”), nevertheless, the voting of this project was a historically significant event. It can be said that Locke's teaching for the first time guessed and analytically clarified the bourgeois-democratic legislative will, and this latter for the first time recognized itself in the principles of Locke's "natural law".

Early bourgeois interpretation of equality

Speaking of a living subject of law and order, Locke always has in mind an isolated individual seeking private gain. Yes and social life in general, it is drawn to him primarily as a network of exchange relations, into which simple commodity owners enter, personally free owners of their forces and property. The "state of nature", as depicted in Locke's second treatise on state government, is primarily a state of "fair" competition based on mutual recognition.

Accordingly, the “natural law” (that is, the rule of coexistence dictated by nature itself) is understood by Locke primarily as a requirement of equal partnership: nature prescribes that each individual accept the other as a free and independent counterparty competing with him in the field of seeking benefits.

Equality and freedom, which are included in Locke's interpretation of the "state of nature" and "natural law", are the equality and freedom that are assumed by the general social meaning of a more or less developed commodity-exchange relationship.

Equality, as Locke interprets it, does not at all mean the natural uniformity (equal quality) of individuals and does not contain a request for their preventive equalization in terms of abilities, forces and property. We are talking only about equality of opportunity and claims, and this immediately indicates the closeness of Locke's legal concept to the forms of consciousness that are adequate to the emerging commodity-capitalist production.

The legal equality insisted on by the early bourgeois epoch only fixes this relationship, which is everywhere implied by the developed commodity exchange. Its essence boils down to the fact that not one of the individuals, no matter how scarce his natural wealth (his intellectual and physical strength, his skills and acquisitions), can be excluded from competition, torn away from the free exchange of goods and services. . Or (which is the same): all people, regardless of their natural inequality, once and for all must be recognized as economically independent subjects in a relationship of voluntary mutual use.

The paradoxical (completely incomprehensible to any of the "traditional" societies) idea of "equality without equalization", equality that allows - and moreover, protects and stimulates - the natural dissimilarity of people, is one of the main themes in the political and legal teachings of innovative philosophers. On English soil, it is first outlined by Hobbes, and then - through Locke - passes to the classic of bourgeois political economy, Adam Smith.

Locke picks up the formula, which in Hobbes had the meaning of one of the norms of state expediency, and emphasizes the actual legal content: the opportunities that the state provides for the realization of natural differences and inequalities are, paradoxically at first glance, the best means for eliminating unnatural privileges, then there is such a political state in which the noble and powerful have the exclusive right to economic and personal independence, while all others drag out a servile existence in different forms and gradations.

Finally, in the first two chapters of Smith's Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (chapters of brilliant thought and style), the idea of "non-equalitarian equality" is put at the heart of the economic-legal program.

Smith sees the specificity of a person, his defining feature as a natural being, in the ability to mutually use these individual differences from the nature. The animal receives absolutely no benefit from the various abilities with which nature has endowed animals like it. On the contrary, among people the most dissimilar talents are useful to one another: their various products, thanks to the tendency to bargain and exchange, are collected, as it were, into one common mass, from which each person can buy for himself any number of products of other people that he needs.

The propensity for bargaining and exchange is elevated by Smith to a generic attribute of humanity: a person for him is in the same sense an exchanging animal, in which for Aristotle he is a social animal, and for

Franklin - “an animal that produces tools.

In nature, there is no trade exchange before man, and no one has ever seen one dog exchange a bone with another. Therefore, there is no dignity in communication, which grows out of the consciousness of its usefulness for another: an animal seeking contact is personified servility and flattery.

Only through exchange do the natural differences of individuals become socially significant, and the individuals themselves become equally worthy in their limitations and peculiarities.

Moreover, exchange forces people to develop and specify their originality, which at first is weakly expressed: This specification, pre-found differences, is nothing more than a division of labor, in which Smith sees the essence of progress.

It is not surprising that in his concept the right to exchange (that is, to independent activity, the voluntary alienation of its products and the acquisition of goods produced by other people unimpeded by any regulations) acts as the right to equal belonging to civilization, to the progressive development of society and its total wealth.

In the developed exchange relation, Marx emphasized, the definition of equality is joined by the definition of freedom. Although individual A feels a need for individual B's product, he does not forcibly seize this product and vice versa , but both of them recognize each other as owners, persons whose will permeates their goods. Therefore, here, first of all, the juridical concept of a person and the moment of freedom, insofar as the latter is contained in this concept, enter. None of the exchangers seizes another's property by force. Everyone transfers it voluntarily... The individual, each of the individuals, is reflected into himself as the exclusive and dominant (determining) subject of exchange.

This statement can serve as a key to understanding the basic meaning of personal freedoms implied in the Lockean concept of natural law.

In the Treatise on Government, Locke formulates three basic innate rights of the individual, which individuals recognize one after another in the "states of nature" and which are then guaranteed by the state itself: these are the right to life, liberty, and property.

In the "state of nature," writes Locke, every man has the consciousness that he "must not, except in doing justice to the criminal ... take such action as would affect the preservation of life, liberty, health, members of the body or the property of another. Accordingly, the coercive power in a state based on reason can never have the right to destroy, enslave or deliberately ruin its subjects ... After all, people have renounced the freedom of the state of nature and tied themselves with appropriate bonds only for the sake of preserving their lives, freedom and property.

These three rights form, according to Locke, the constitutional basis of the legal order, and for the first time make possible legislation that is not restrictive but emancipatory in its essential meaning, legislation the very possibility of which was inconceivable to traditional legal thinking. Despite all sorts of false interpretations, the purpose of the law is not to destroy or restrict, but to preserve and expand freedom ... After all, freedom consists in not experiencing restrictions and violence from others, and this cannot be done where there is no law .. It represents the freedom of a person to dispose and dispose, as he pleases, of his personality, his actions ... and all his property.

Locke's triple legal formula (freedom, life, property) was included in many early bourgeois constitutions and was a "cell" from which developedthen the more differentiated content of "human and civil rights".

In Locke's treatise, the right to liberty, the right to life and the right to property do not act as external to each other, side by side principles. They represent an elementary system of rights, where one norm necessarily refers to another.

In each of the three rights proclaimed by Locke, it is ultimately about the same thing: the recognition of people as full-fledged "subjects of exchange", independent commodity owners, "whose will permeates their goods.

The model of exchange is invisibly present in the very concept of freedom, as Locke uses it. This concept always implies an attitude to the counterparty, which has consciousness, will, intentionality. Almost nowhere do we find naturalistic metaphors of freedom in Locke: expressions like "freedom from gravity", "freedom from passions", "freedom from poverty". This is all the more remarkable because his closest predecessor, Hobbes, directly relied on the naturalistic metaphor as the basis of the philosophical definition of freedom: Hobbes, for example, considers water that flows freely over the surface to be free, and water closed in a vessel is not free.

Locke, unlike Hobbes, consistently pursues the point of view that to nature, as it exists before and outside of man, the concepts of freedom and unfreedom are generally inapplicable. They make sense only where there are mutual relations between people, mutual conscious-volitional claims. Therefore, the opposite of freedom is not constraint and constraint in general (for example, dependence on circumstances), but coercion, oppression, violence, seizure. It is pointless to complain about "non-freedom" where it is impossible to detect someone else's enslaving will, deliberate (calculable) expansion.

Accordingly, freedom is always a relationship between individuals, a relationship of mutual voluntariness, the pure manifestation of which is the market. The state and society must recognize the individual in the sense in which he is already recognized by another individual who exchanges with him the products of labor.

The right to free disposal of property acts as a final, resulting, integrative one, and the right to freedom and life - as its prerequisite.

Locke's systematic thought can be expressed, in my opinion, by the following statements:

a) freedom in the narrow sense (freedom of choice, or the right to subjectively set and pursue goals) is flawed and limited if it is not complemented by the freedom to dispose of individual vital forces (the right to life) and the freedom to dispose of products that embody subjective goals and life goals. force (ownership);

b) the right of ownership is defective and limited if it extends only to things and does not guarantee the possibility of voluntary alienation of one's vitality, labor power (the most important aspect of the right to life) and the ability to "dispose of one's personality as one likes" (freedom in the narrow sense of the word).

In order to understand how this interpenetration of three seemingly heterogeneous rights became possible, let us consider in more detail Locke's understanding of each of them.

1. At the forefront of Locke's natural law concept is the right to property. It includes the right to life and liberty and often appears in the text of Locke's treatise as the most general designation of the political and legal status of an individual.

In property, the individual rises above himself as an empirical individuality; accordingly, through property, society and the state, as it were, recognize the individual in the last sources of his freedom and independence. In this regard, Locke refers to the following custom that developed in the Cromwellian army - a custom that fixes one of the main maxims of the new (early bourgeois) sense of justice: A general who can sentence a soldier to death for leaving his post without permission or for disobeying the most reckless orders does not can, with all his absolute power ... dispose of even one farthing of the property of this soldier, or appropriate even a small fraction of his property.

Property is sacred, more sacred than the very existence of its empirical bearer. Locke sees the explanation of this paradoxical maxim in the fact that property embodies labor, that is, the purposeful, conscious and planned activity of the subject, through which he first constitutes himself as a person and a recognized member of the human community.

More consistently than any of his predecessors, Locke expressed the main objective appearance of the early bourgeois era - the appearance that labor is the substance of any private ownership.

Locke's concept was the prologue to one of the greatest scientific achievements XVIII century (the labor theory of value), and a whole complex of vulgar economic views, grouped around the idea of a direct coincidence of the worker and the owner in every "natural" individual.

It is labor, as Locke believed, that creates differences in the value of all things ... If we correctly evaluate the things that we use and dissect what their value consists of, what is directly from nature in them and what is from labor, then we shall see that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths must be attributed wholly to labor.

This is a formula that any representative of classical bourgeois political economy would subscribe to.

But since Locke is still very far from distinguishing between abstract and concrete labor, since the process of creating value is drawn to him as a process of direct embodiment in the product of living individual efforts, the theoretically correct idea of determining value by labor turns out to be a theoretically erroneous idea in him regarding the labor origin of any property. . What a person has extracted from objects created and provided to him by nature, he has merged with his labor, with something that belongs to him inalienably - and thereby makes it his property. Thanks to labor, he attaches something to an object - and thereby makes it his property ... His labor created the difference between these things and the general.

Let us note, however, that Locke's idea of the origin of all property from labor, no matter how naive it may be by the standards of later economic and historical-economic views, is not just a delusion.

First, it expresses a special kind of illusion, an illusion that becomes true under certain exceptional ("ideal") conditions for the organization of economic practice (in the presence of an economic structure, all of whose agents would be simple commodity owners).

Secondly, this thought, erroneous as a judgment about the actual facts of economic history, nevertheless contains an element of normative truth. It is not true that property of different sizes arose as the result of different degrees of diligence, but it is true that society should recognize and sanction differences in property if they really are the result of different degrees of diligence; it is not true that any property is the fruit of the labor of its owner, but it is legally irrefutable in relation to any individual that the labor of his body and the work of his hands, by the very nature of things, belongs to him. The statement “labor is the substance of property” is a “rationalization”, a pseudo-explanation that will turn into an essential (“true”) reality what is actually true only in the sense of obligation and, moreover, strictly legal obligation: “society and the state are obliged to recognize any property which is the result of labour.

This normative (and moreover, normative-limiting) meaning of Locke's reasoning about labor as the substance of property was clearly recorded by Marx in The Theories of Surplus Value. According to Locke, he noted, natural law makes personal labor the limit of property.

It was the positing of labor as the basis of all private ownership that allowed Locke to merge together the three basic innate rights of the individual.

2. Work aimed at achieving individual well-being and benefits is recognized by Locke as the defining form of human life, which primarily means the right to life.

This right, as Locke interprets it, cannot be reduced to a simple prohibition of murder, to a codification of the third biblical commandment. Locke's treatises reproduce moral-religious arguments regarding the sacredness of life and its transcendent, divine origins * However, this is not the specific Locke theme.

Violation of the right to life is, according to Locke, already any enslavement of the individual, any forcible appropriation of his productive abilities. Not murder as such, but slavery, that is, an economic condition in which one person receives at his full disposal the vital forces of another and is free to do anything to him, up to murder - this is what is primarily prohibited by the Lockean right to life. . It denies not so much the element of robbery and criminality, in which an attempt on life appears as a massive, but still an accidental fact, as the right to kill, crowning the utilitarian arbitrariness of the master over the slave - the socially sanctioned reduction of a person to the position of a working animal, a thing , tools.

From the idea that life, as a gift from God, is the inalienable property of the living, Locke draws not only the moral inadmissibility of murder as an individual act, but also a purely legal conclusion of the inconceivability of voluntary slavery, or (which is the same) of the legal unnaturalness the last one.

This is not the place to discuss whether Locke is right in the historical sense. It is important that slavery appears to him as a condition incompatible with a reasonable social order in the same sense as murder is incompatible with the last. That is why Locke cannot in any way admit that under the social system described and sanctioned by the holy book - the Bible, there could be an indefinite and complete alienation of individual vitality. For Locke, it is self-evident that the true right to life exists only where society consists of economically independent producers, some of whom (under the pressure of "needs and circumstances", and not because of someone else's compulsion) temporarily sell themselves into work. Under any other social conditions, life, strictly speaking, is no longer guaranteed.

We would express ourselves too strongly if we said that life in general is reduced by Locke to activity subordinated to happiness and profit as the inalienable personal goals of each individual. And at the same time, there is no doubt that the existence of a person who has been deprived of the possibility of such activity does not fall under the concept of "life", as it is conceived in Locke's expression "the right to life."

3. From this, the inner connection that exists between this right and the last member of Locke's "triple formula" becomes clear, namely, freedom in the narrow sense of the word.

Freedom, Locke explains, exists where everyone is recognized as “the owner of his own personality.

The right to freedom, therefore, fixes as its direct and immediate meaning that which was only implied in the right to life, was present as its deep content. Right of freedom a limit denies any relationship of personal dependence (the relationship of a slave and a slave owner, a serf and a serf-owner, a serf and a master).

But this right also has its own deep content. If the ultimate intention of the right to life was the prohibition of slavery as an economic (private-ownership) relationship, then the right to freedom, in the final analysis, means the denial of political slavery, or despotism. The point is that in a reasonable society, no person can be a slave, vassal or servant of the state itself.

Let us take a closer look at the problem of complex conceptual distinctions that arises here (a problem that was recognized by Locke, but was not completely solved by him). In the conditions of slavery as an economic relation, the very possibility of setting and pursuing one's own goals (benefit) is taken away from the individual: the slave is an irresponsible instrument of someone else's will.

This form of unfreedom can also take place in the structure of a despotic state. However, its specific tendency is different. despotic power enslaves the individual primarily in the way that it imposes on him his goals (his ideas about what is beneficial, worthy, saving, etc.). It lays claim not to the labor (productive power) of the individual directly, but to his very ability to set goals, to his convictions and conscience, by mastering which she appropriates, among other things, his work. With classical clarity, this form of domination was projected in medieval theocratic concepts. Here it was assumed that a Christian, as a subject of the “city of God” (church-state), could be prescribed his very subjective aspirations, that he could be subjected to violence and even destruction for reasons of his own, but “correctly understood” good (salvation, bliss). The frank and cynical utilization of the individual, which is characteristic of slavery as an economic relation, was replaced here by utilization, carried out under the form of pastoral guardianship, guidance, and education. Directly dominating the thoughts (and only thoughts) of the believer, the medieval church got the opportunity to appoint him and his deeds; by forcibly turning the individual away from independently perceived (and therefore “seeming”, “deceptive”) benefits, she derived her own benefit from his labors and sacrifices.

State absolutism has become a rather consistent successor of the church in the matter of such paternalistic enslavement of the individual. XVII century, against which the Lockean legal concept was directly directed.

It is no coincidence that Locke considers doubtful and unreliable any declaration of the right to property and the right to life, which is not based on guarantees of free individual self-determination.

People cannot in fact be either full owners of their property, or independent commodity producers, if they are not provided with freedom of conscience (the right to an independent personal judgment about God and the world order), which then develops into freedom of vocation (the right to independently determine the ultimate goals, the general meaning individual existence) and utilitarian autonomy (the right of independent discretion by each person of what for him personally is useful and harmful, profitable and unprofitable, salvific and pernicious).

This aspect of Locke's legal conception is not explicitly expressed in treatises on state government. However, it is expressed quite clearly by earlier works: "An Essay on the Law of Nature" and the famous "Letter on Toleration".

The main idea of the Essay on the Law of Nature, at first glance, is simply a utilitarian reduction of ethics (reducing good to pleasure, and evil to suffering). However, the real pathos of the treatise is not in this: Locke insists that each person has the ability to independently navigate the problems related to his pleasure and pain, benefit and harm. Any attempt to decide for the individual what is beneficial for him and what is detrimental is morally untenable. If it also casts itself into social coercion, then such mentoring, no matter how good its motives, is despotism (domestic, corporate or state).

This most important setting of "Experience ..." echoes the central idea of "Letter on religious tolerance", one of the few works XVII century, where the principle of tolerance has been brought to the direct upholding of freedom of conscience and the separation of church and state.

Starting from the principle of utilitarian autonomy postulated in the "Experience ...", Locke believes that no one can be forced to be rich or healthy against his will in the same sense, it should be recognized that the care of his own soul belongs to each person and should be provided to him ." It is impossible to look at things that a person should sincerely comprehend in himself and achieve their knowledge through reasoning, research, study and his own aspirations,as a special profession of some one category of people.

No one has the right to comprehend God for another; it is not given to anyone to possess the obligatory knowledge of the meaning of life about the world as a whole. An attempt to impose such knowledge with the help of state coercion should be directly attributed to the number of socially dangerous actions.

The acquisition of faith (or, in a broader sense, the formation of worldview attitudes) is for Locke a secret and inherently personal process. Although from the epistemological and psychological point of view there is nothing mysterious in it (here “light and evidence” dominate), however, the coercive power must treat this process as if it were a kind of personal secret action.

Own conviction (faith, attitude) is the first property and the first freedom that a reasonable state guarantees to every individual: an unfettered conscience forms the basis of all rights.

This corresponds to the following cumulative picture of the life of the "natural individual" that emerges in Locke's works: faith projects itself in terms of goals, goals are realized in the enterprise (labor), labor is embodied in property. Or (if you look at the same process from the other end): the owner in the individual always presupposes the worker, and this latter - the subject of independent convictions (the independent).

This picture, if understood as an image of a real socio-economic phenomenon, is idyllic through and through. It does not take into account the alienation of property from labor, which is constantly taking place in the conditions of a class society, and of labor itself from that subjectivity of the individual, which expresses itself in goal-setting, conviction and faith.

The matter, however, will look different if the same picture is interpreted as the assertion of a certain norm and model.

Only that activity is worthy of the name of "free enterprise" ("labor" in the early bourgeois sense of it), which is based on independent judgment, choice and goal-setting. This is true in the same sense in which only property acquired by labor is recognized as the inalienable property of the individual. And if Marx saw Locke’s merit in the fact that his “natural law” “makes personal labor the limit of property,” then on the same basis we can say that Locke was the first to see in freedom of conscience an elementary condition (and in this sense, a normative limit) observance of which alone makes labor itself personal labor.

Locke's "Natural Law" formulated a new political-legal ideal: the ideal of a society in which every person is recognized from the very beginning as an independent worker-owner.

Such is the full formula of Locke's "natural individual" and, at the same time, the complete formula for the status of a legal entity. It already implicitly contains the entire list of "freedoms" that will be expanded later in the bourgeois-democratic declarations of "the rights of man and citizen." In fact, to recognize an independent in a person means to legally guarantee freedom of conscience, speech, press, assembly, and associations; to recognize him as a worker means to raise the question of freedom of profession, freedom of movement, etc.

But what is even more significant is Locke's discovery of the deep semantic unity of all rights-freedoms.

Locke's philosophical and legal treatises take the form of theoretical constructions explaining what a state, law, property is, how one social state arises from another, etc. In reality, however, Locke's explanations explain little: in their real content, they are not nothing more than a detour to the analytical clarification of the relationship between various norms, formulas of obligation, which were developed by the new, early bourgeois legal consciousness. Under the form of rational proofs (arguments from God, or from a wise, God-arranged Nature), in Locke's philosophical and legal treatises, in fact, judgments of the following type unfold: “advocating for the civil world (order), one cannot but stand up for the rule of law”; or: "there is no true respect for property without respect for independent conviction"; or: "the right to life is worthless if it does not include the right to freely dispose of one's life", etc.

The establishment of the internal unity of all rights-freedoms, which Locke, continuing the work of other innovative philosophers, carried out through pseudo-explanations (“rationalization”), was in itself a huge achievement of the early bourgeois era.

Thanks to this, a completely specific, holistically unified world of norms was seen, previously realized either separately (fragmentally), or as subordinate moments of other normative formations: morality and custom, canon law and "state wisdom"; as a result, for the first time, objectivity was posited, with which jurisprudence deals as a special science, “spun off” from traditional, “moral” philosophy.

Locke's concept of natural law is opposed not only to feudal socio-political views, but also to the way of thinking generally characteristic of pre-capitalist societies. It requires from the state not just “wise guardianship of subjects”, not just paternal care and a rational combination of “general benefit with private” (even Roman law, the most unconventional of the traditional political and legal systems, is not free from such attitudes). It puts at the forefront respect for the capacity and civic independence of the individual.

Solovyov E.Yu. The Locke Phenomenon // Solovyov E.Yu. The past interprets us. –M.1991-p. 146-166.

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Solovyov, Erich Yurievich

(b. 04/20/1934) - special. in the region history of Western Europe. philosophy; Dr. Philosophy Sciences. Graduated from philosophy. Faculty of Moscow State University (1957). From 1958 to 1968 - deputy. head department of modern zarub. philosophy and. "VF". In 1968-1970 - present. With. Institute of Intern. labor movement, the social sector psychol. and masses, movements. Since 1970 - at the Institute of Physics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (RAS), currently. temp. - Ch. n. With. Cand. diss. - Existentialism and scientific knowledge"(1967). Doctoral diss. - "The era of early bourgeois revolutions and the practical philosophy of Kant" (1991). In the 60s. P. Sartre, in contrast to the common interpretation of existentialism as "philosophical despair and fear", argued that the essence of this direction is in stoic resistance to pessimism, born of the crisis of the traditional bourgeois religion of progress. S. sees one example of such an understanding of history in the works of Marx 1848-1852 (VF 1968, No. 5). and the legal ideas of the German Reformation, prepared (the first in the USSR) scientific biography of Luther, who interprets the Reformation as a great socio-cultural upheaval, in the course of which entrepreneurial economic ethics, the early bourgeois legal and contractual theory of the state, were born. Dr. region research, interested in S., - ethics and philosophical and legal teachings of Kant. S. sees in Kant not so much the ancestor of it. Class. philosophic, as the largest completer of the Enlightenment, many of whose ideas were not understood by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Works S. last. years devoted to the problems of human rights and the legal state-va. In discussions about the development of Russia, S. insists that Russia in the new East. conditions must repeat the spirit., ideol. efforts, to-rye ensured the formation of citizens. about-va, legal system and profitable economy in Western countries. In the works of S. metodol are also considered. problems of biographical, situational-ist. analysis, a comprehensive study of the key eras of the spirit. development, as well as questions of philosophy. personality theory.

Op.: Existentialism. Critical essay // VF. 1966. No. 12. 1967. No. 1;Existentialism and scientific knowledge. M., 1966 ;Classic and modern:two epochs in the development of bourgeois philosophy.[In col.]// Philosophy and science. M., 1972 ;Church,state and law in the era of early bourgeois revolutions. M., 1983 ;The past interprets us. Essays on the history of philosophy and culture. M., 1990 ;I.Kant:complementary morality and law. M., 1992.

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