Genrikh Lyushkov. The man who cheated fate for seven years

Lushkov Genrih Lushkov Career: Actor
Birth: Russia, 19.8.1945
Lyushkov Genrikh Samoilovich (1900, Odessa - August 19, 1945, Dairen, China), one of the heads of the bodies state security, Commissioner of State Security 3rd rank (11/29/1935). Son of a tailor. He received his education at the Humanitarian and Social Institute (1920).

State Security Commissioner of the 3rd rank. B 1934-1936 deputy head of the secret political department of the NKVD of the USSR. In the period from December 2 to December 30, he was in Leningrad, where, on Stalin’s instructions, he directly participated in the investigation into the circumstances of the murder of S.M. Kirov. In 1937 - early 1938, Lyushkov, at that time the head of the Far Eastern Directorate of the NKVD, on Stalin's instructions, was in charge of arrests, executions in the region (in a single year, 250 thousand people were repressed, of which 7 thousand were shot), deportations to Central Asia near 200 thousand Koreans. As the most optimal and worthy, he represented Kolyma in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. But not for the long term. In mid-1938, two high-ranking bandits Lev Mekhlis and Mikhail Frinovsky came to restore order among the local security officers. Lyushkov was asked to leave for Moscow. The Politburo allegedly decided to recruit him to work in the central apparatus of the NKVD. But the experienced security officer understood what this promotion meant. In the dark from June 12 to 13, taking valuable documents, under the guise of an inspection trip (his position also commanded local border troops), Lyushkov crossed the line from Manchukuo (Manchuria). Subsequently, Lyushkov collaborated with Japanese intelligence and gave them a lot of secret information. He was interned and sent to Harbin prison. In August 1945, the retreating Japanese shot more than one defector who knew (Book Review. 1990. October 26, p. 6).

On July 3, 1938, in a conversation with the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri, Lyushkov stated: Until recently, I committed great crimes against the people, since I actively collaborated with Stalin in pursuing his policy of deception and terrorism. I am truly a traitor. But I am a traitor only in relation to Stalin... These are the immediate reasons for my escape from the USSR, but this does not end there. There are also more important and fundamental reasons that prompted me to do this.

This is what I am convinced that Leninist principles have ceased to be the basis of party policy. For the first time I felt hesitation since the assassination of Kirov by Nikolaev at the end of 1934. This episode was fatal for the country as well as for the party. I was then in Leningrad. I was not only directly involved in the investigation of Kirov’s murder, but also actively took part in public trials and executions carried out later than the Kirov case under the leadership of Yezhov. I was involved in the following cases:

1. The case of the so-called Leningrad terrorist center at the beginning of 1935.

2. The case of the terrorist center about the conspiracy against Stalin in the Kremlin in 1935.

3. The case of the so-called Trotskyist-Zinoviev joint center in August 1936.

Before the whole world, I can certify with full responsibility that all these imaginary conspiracies never existed and they were all deliberately fabricated.

Nikolaev (killer of Kirov. Comp.) of course did not belong to Zinoviev’s group. He was an abnormal man who suffered from delusions of grandeur. He decided to disappear in order to go down in history as a hero. This is clear from his diary.

At the trial, which took place in August 1936, accusations that the Trotskyists, through Olberg, were connected with the German Gestapo, accusations against Zinoviev and Kamenev of espionage, accusations that Zinoviev and Kamenev were connected with the so-called right center" through Tomsky , Rykov and Bukharin, were completely fabricated. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Tomsky, Rykov, Bukharin and many others were executed as enemies of Stalin who opposed his destructive policies.

Stalin used the opportunity presented by the Kirov affair to fend off these people through the fabrication of vast anti-Stalin conspiracies, espionage trials and terrorist organizations.

So Stalin got rid of political opponents and those who might become them in the future by all means possible. Stalin's diabolical methods led to the downfall of even very sophisticated and strong people. His events gave rise to a heap of tragedies. This happened not only thanks to Stalin’s hysterical suspicion, but also on the basis of his firm determination to get rid of all Trotskyists and rightists who are Stalin’s political opponents and could pose a political threat in the future... (Rehabilitation. Political processes of the 30-50s . M., 1991. P. 183).

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Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov In the state security agencies, Lyushkov came to court and began a rapid career. On August 7, 1931, he was transferred to Moscow, to the central office of the OGPU-NKVD, and a few months later he ended up in Berlin, where he found out the military secrets of the Junkers aircraft manufacturing company. It’s not very clear how he did it, since German, as well as others foreign languages, Lyushkov did not know, but the results of his secret business trip resulted in a detailed report that ended up on Stalin’s desk and, perhaps, was remembered by the leader. However, further up the career ladder Lyushkov moved not in the direction of industrial espionage, but in the direction of exposing the internal enemies of the Soviet regime. In 1933, Genrikh Samoilovich, as deputy head of the secret political department of the OGPU, fabricated the case of the “Russian National Party” (the so-called “Slavist case”) and personally interrogated those arrested. In December 1934, he was sent to Leningrad, where he took an active part in the investigation into the murder of Kirov.

Lyushkov clearly enjoyed the favor of the all-powerful People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Genrikh Yagoda. Since 1935, having received the title of State Security Commissioner of the third rank, he personally prepared the texts of reports and notes of the People's Commissar to the Central Committee. In the central apparatus of the GPU, Lyushkov was considered right hand Berries. The People's Commissar sent his protégé to "solve" such important cases as the "Kremlin" and the "Trotskyist-Zinoviev center" and entrusted him with preparing the open Moscow trial in August 1936. In September, Yagoda was removed from the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, and in January 1937 he was arrested. In the central apparatus of the NKVD, the new People's Commissar Nikolai Yezhov carried out a grand purge. All of Yagoda’s more or less visible employees came under the knife. The only exception was Genrikh Lyushkov. He knew Yezhov from the investigation of Kirov’s murder, and then they clashed more than once because of Nikolai Ivanovich’s attempts to control the investigation. However, two years later, Yezhov, contrary to his rules, did not recall the old feuds. Lyushkov suddenly found himself in his favor. Yesterday’s colleagues of Genrikh Samoilovich testified against him, but the “Steel People’s Commissar” ordered the investigators to rewrite the protocols, removing all references to his favorite. At this time, Lyushkov received a new responsible post - the head of the NKVD for the Azov-Black Sea region. In the south, Lyushkov not only led the increasingly widespread repressions, but was also involved in strengthening the system of protecting the vacation spots of the leaders of the party and the Soviet state, including Stalin’s own dacha in Matsesta. He coped with his duties very well. At the beginning of the summer of 1937, he was called to Moscow, awarded the Order of Lenin, and transferred to an even more important direction - to the Far East. Before leaving, Lyushkov received a personal audience with Stalin himself. Lyushkov received three secret assignments from the leader: to monitor Marshal Blucher, to personally arrest the chief of aviation of the Far Eastern Army, Lapin, and the previous head of the NKVD for the Far East, Balitsky. Lyushkov knew the latter from the twenties from joint work in Ukraine, but as he himself later recalled, “if I had shown any emotions or hesitation when receiving these assignments, I would not have left the Kremlin.” The importance of his future work was explained to the new head of the NKVD department for the Far East - Japan was then considered potential enemy of the USSR No. 1, and the entire vast border area was teeming with hidden enemies of Soviet power. Inspired by the leader’s parting words, Lyushkov rushed off to his new duty station. On Far East he "turned around". First of all, Lyushkov arrested forty local NKVD leaders. All of them, as if by choice, turned out to be “active participants” in the right-wing Trotskyist organization. The matter was not limited to internal security personnel issues. State Security Commissioner of the third rank G.S. Lyushkov conceived, organized and brilliantly implemented one of the first resettlement of peoples in the USSR - all Koreans, who, unfortunately, were citizens Soviet Union were sent to Central Asia. Based on the results of such vigorous activity, Genrikh Samoilovich could count on another order, but with some sixth sense he sensed that the matter smelled of kerosene - a new cleansing of organs was approaching. Lyushkov decided not to wait for arrest and began preparing to escape. First he took care of his family. For his stepdaughter, who was often ill in the Far Eastern climate, he obtained permission in Moscow to undergo treatment in Poland, and sent his wife Nina Lyushkova-Pismennaya along with the girl across the country to the west. As it turned out, not in vain. On May 26, 1938, a telegram arrived from Yezhov: Lyushkov was being promoted to Moscow. Realizing that he was being called to the capital for arrest, the security officer cheerfully replied that he was happy to justify the trust of the party. At the beginning of June, he received a telegram from his wife with the words agreed upon in advance: “I am sending my kisses.” This meant that the family was safe. On June 12, 1938, the head of the Far Eastern NKVD went with an inspection to the border zone. In the morning, he announced that he needed to personally meet with a particularly important Manchurian illegal agent, and, accompanied by the head of the outpost, he moved to the control strip. Leaving his fellow traveler in the forest, he ordered them to wait for about forty minutes and went to the other side. The border guard waited for two hours, then raised the outpost with his gun. Until the morning, the soldiers combed the surrounding area, but did not find the high commander. On the morning of June 13, a man in a field uniform with three crimson diamonds on his buttonholes and orders on his chest came across a Manchurian border guard and, in broken Japanese, ordered him to be taken to headquarters. At first they were afraid of such a gift and timidly reported the guest to their superiors. A few days later Lyushkov was already in Tokyo. The escape was carefully hidden by both the Japanese and Soviet sides, but the USSR soon made the appropriate organizational conclusions. Lyushkov's betrayal was one of the reasons for the removal of his patron Yezhov and one of the main points of accusation against the steel people's commissar. On June 24, information about the transfer of some important security officer to the Japanese appeared in a Riga newspaper. A few days later, this news, already with the mention of Lyushkov’s name, was picked up by the German press. The Japanese decided that there was no point in hiding the fugitive. On July 13, a press conference was held at the Sanno Hotel in Tokyo. There were more plainclothes security guards than journalists - the Japanese were seriously afraid of an assassination attempt on the defector. First, Lyushkov spoke to foreign journalists, and then to Japanese ones. He showed his official ID and the certificates of a deputy of the Supreme Council, said that he was not an opponent of the USSR, but of Stalinism, and dwelt in detail on the scale of repressions in the Soviet Union. In the offices of Japanese intelligence officers, Lyushkov was much more talkative. He described in detail the locations of Red Army units in the Far East, their numbers, and the system for deploying troops in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. The Japanese General Staff was unpleasantly surprised by the numerical superiority of the Soviet troops, who far outnumbered the Japanese not only in manpower, but also in the number of aircraft and tanks. The veracity of the defector’s words was confirmed during the clashes that soon occurred on Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol. In addition, the security officer handed over to the new owners all the Soviet agents he knew about, including the white general Semyonov, recruited by the NKVD. The German Abwehr became seriously interested in Lyushkov’s information. Admiral Canaris sent his personal representative, Colonel Grayling, to Tokyo, who, based on the results of conversations with the former security officer, compiled a thick report. Moscow demanded that its resident in Japan, Richard Sorge, find out what exactly Lyushkov had blabbed to the Germans, but the all-powerful agent Ramsay was able to retake only a few pages of this report. However, even from them it was clear that Lyushkov was not hiding anything. In exchange for all this information, Genrikh Samoilovich only asked to find his family. But a thorough search in Poland and the Baltic states did not yield results. Later it turned out that the wife was in a hurry to send the agreed telegram and on June 15, 1938, she was arrested along with her daughter on the territory of the USSR. There is still information that Nina Pismennaya-Lyushkova was shot after severe torture, but in fact the authorities treated her gently. On January 19, 1939, Lyushkova-Pismennaya N.V. was sentenced as a member of the family of a traitor to the motherland to 8 years in the camps. On February 15, 1940, a Special Meeting of the NKVD reviewed her case, decided to consider her to have served her sentence, and sent her into five-year exile. In 1962, Nina Pismennaya was completely rehabilitated and moved to Latvia, where she died in 1999. Her daughter Lyudmila did not perish, as was alleged, in a special orphanage, but was raised by relatives and died in Latvia in 2010. Lyushkov could not know all this, he only understood that his family was missing. For this, he decided to take personal revenge on Stalin and invited the Japanese to organize an assassination attempt on him. While working in the south, Lyushkov personally developed a security system for Stalin’s dacha in Matsesta and planned to strike the leader there. A prepared group of white emigrants was transferred by the Japanese to the Soviet-Turkish border. A carefully developed plan for one of the very few real attempts on Stalin’s life fell through at the last moment - among the saboteurs was an NKVD agent, about whom Lyushkov did not know. The border crossing failed. After this, Lyushkov completely stopped communicating with White emigrants in China, fearing numerous Soviet agents. Lyushkov was appointed senior consultant to the secret department of the Japanese General Staff, which was engaged in intelligence, propaganda and psychological warfare against the USSR. The former security officer regularly became acquainted with the Soviet press and compiled extensive but very practical reports, extracts from which were even published anonymously in the Japanese press. Lyushkov lived alone, did not walk much, and was only interested in work. His lifestyle did not change when he was transferred to the headquarters of the Kwantung Army during the war. The measured work of the defector was disrupted in August 1945. Soon after the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, traces of Lyushkov were lost. According to the official version, on August 19, the head of the Dairen military mission, Yutaka Takeoka, suggested that Lyushkov shoot himself to avoid being captured by the Soviets, and after refusing, he shot the security officer himself. According to other evidence, the Japanese wanted to exchange the defector for the captured son of Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, and when Lyushkov resisted, they simply strangled him. Both of these versions end with one thing: the cremation of the body of the former security officer. That is, no one saw Lyushkov’s corpse, and this raises questions: why would the Japanese, after the surrender, in a panicked flight, bother with cremating the body of some gaijin? There is indirect evidence that Lyushkov was seen in a crowd mad with fear at the Dairen station the day after his alleged death. Perhaps he managed to escape and live to old age somewhere in Australia, or maybe he was captured and shot - back in 1939 in the USSR he was sentenced to death in absentia. Be that as it may, after August 1945, the unsinkable Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov did not surface anywhere.

Tishchenko's telegram was reported to the intelligence chief P. Fitin. He gave instructions to present the materials available on Stennes, and then authorized a meeting with him. On March 14, 1939, Tishchenko visited Stennes at his apartment. During the conversation, Stennes said that, in his opinion, the world is facing the start of a new big war. And the main culprit for this is Hitler, who, seeing that the Western powers are not putting serious pressure on him, is becoming more and more impudent. Moreover, he actively began to prepare for an attack on the USSR.

When Tishchenko asked why he was so outspoken, Stennes replied that his main goal was to overthrow Hitler and create a democratic Germany. Stennes is convinced that work in this direction should begin with the army. And after the start of the war, the leaders of the anti-Hitler emigration should create a government of a new Germany and achieve its international recognition. At the end of the conversation, Stennes informed Tishchenko that his duties as an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, in addition to security, also included the management of his intelligence. Therefore, he could share information with Soviet representatives on a “gentlemanly” basis, but without revealing his sources. For this, he asks only one thing: when the time comes, help him come to Germany through the USSR.

The Center carefully analyzed the content of the conversation between Tishchenko and Stennes. As a result, the opinion was expressed that he openly expressed a desire to cooperate with Soviet intelligence, but did not want to be a simple source of information, but would not mind establishing political ties with Moscow. In this regard, an operational case was opened against Stennes, who received the pseudonym Friend. But the successful contacts soon broke down. Perhaps this was due to the fact that Tishchenko was recalled to the USSR, and no replacement was sent to him.

Stennes's next meeting with a representative of Soviet intelligence took place at the end of 1940. On November 25, resident of the INO NKVD in Tokyo, Dolbin, who worked under the “roof” of a TASS representative, received instructions signed by L. Beria to find Stennes and restore contact with him. In December, Dolbin met with Stennes in Chongqing. He was glad to resume contacts and said that he would still like to visit the USSR, although the conditions for this were not yet ripe. Dolbin reported on the meeting to the Center and offered to take advantage of the upcoming arrival in Moscow of Stennes’ wife, who was heading to China through the USSR to join him. According to Dolbin, she could, under the pretext of “illness,” stay in Moscow, and Stennes would get a reason to visit her.

Dolbin's proposal interested Beria. He summoned the deputy head of the INO, P. A. Sudoplatov, and asked him to express his opinion. Sudoplatov supported Dolbin’s idea, and a representative of the Center, Vasily Zarubin, was sent to Shanghai, where Stennes had lived since the spring of 1940, to implement it.

Zarubin went to China in January 1941 under the cover of an employee of the State Bank of the USSR. He met with Stennes at his villa, located in the French Quarter of Shanghai. They discussed the conditions for Stennes’s arrival in Moscow, after which he wrote a note to his wife, recommending Zarubin to her as his good friend in China. Stennes resolutely rejected the material assistance offered by Zarubin, saying that he was collaborating with Soviet intelligence not for the sake of money, but in accordance with his own convictions.

Referring to the current political situation in the world, Stennes said that Hitler would certainly attack the USSR. Therefore, it is in Moscow’s interests to provide China with comprehensive assistance in order to fetter the Japanese army and prevent Japan from assisting Germany in resolving European issues, especially since relations between Berlin and Tokyo are far from cloudless. Zarubin transmitted the information received from Stennes to the Center on February 23, 1941, adding that Friend could not yet travel to Moscow. He also said that the Tokyo correspondent of the German newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung, Richard Sorge, who visited Shanghai, told Stennes that relations between Germany and Japan were extremely tense. ,

The next meeting between Zarubin and Stennes took place on June 9, 1941. At it, Stennes reported that, according to a senior German official who had recently arrived from Berlin, Germany had completely completed economic and military preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. The attack itself was scheduled for May, but was postponed until mid-June. According to the developed plan, the war will be fleeting and will last no more than three months. Given its importance, Stennes asked that this information be immediately transferred to Moscow. On June 20, 1941, Zarubin sent a coded telegram to the Center, which said: “In a conversation with me, a friend categorically stated: based on reliable data, he knows that Hitler is fully prepared for war with the Soviet Union. A friend warns us, and we must draw appropriate conclusions from this.”

Having completed the assignment given to him, Zarubin returned to Moscow. Saying goodbye to him, Stennes said that due to the current situation, he considered it his duty to inform the USSR on the most important political issues, and asked to give him a reliable liaison for this. At the same time, he added that he did not give up hope of coming to the USSR.

However, on June 22, the Great Patriotic War began, and Stennes’ trip to the USSR did not take place. At the same time, foreign intelligence officer in Tokyo Rogov periodically met with Stennes and received information from him on issues of German-Japanese relations, Japanese and German policies towards China, and most importantly, whether Japan would act against the USSR. At the end of the war, the Center received a message from Tokyo from one of the agents in China regarding Stennes. It proposed connecting him to the work of the anti-fascist organizations “Free Germany” and “Free Officers”. But in Moscow, one of the intelligence leaders, without leaving his signature, put the following resolution on the message: “The Source overestimates the personality of the Friend. He is no longer such a major figure that his location influences the politics and relations of states.”

Not feeling supported, Stennes expressed doubts to Rogov about the advisability of his return to Germany. In addition, he said that the Americans invited him to cooperate with them. Stennes categorically refused this offer and in 1948, together with Chiang Kai-shek’s troops, left for Taiwan. Stennes returned to Germany only in the early 50s and immediately became involved in political activities. At the same time, employees of the office of the MGB Commissioner in Berlin established contact with him. Stennes stated that he was ready to continue cooperation with Soviet intelligence in the national interests of Germany. However, the Center rejected Stennes's offer to work "on a purely German basis", and in 1952 contacts with him were stopped.

In September 1939 he arrived in Chongqing new ambassador USSR Alexander Semenovich Panyushkin. At the same time, he was appointed chief resident of the INO NKVD in China. The combination of positions was caused by the critical situation in China and the need to concentrate all efforts to counter Japanese aggression and disrupt its plans to split China and create puppet states on its territory. In addition, the Soviet leadership wanted to receive verified assessments of the situation in the Far East, which could help make the right political decisions in the context of the approaching war with Germany. All these tasks became even more urgent after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese agreement in July 1939 (the Arita-Craigie agreement - the English version of the “Far Eastern Munich”, actually directed against China), the subsequent concessions of the Western powers to Japan and the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 .

One of the main tasks of the Chongqing station was to prevent the strengthening of separatist sentiments in the government of Chiang Kai-shek and to keep it in positions of active resistance to the Japanese invaders. To this end, Panyushkin managed to establish trusting relationships with a number of Kuomintang leaders who were in the position of strengthening friendship with the USSR and continuing the anti-Japanese war. Among them were Marshal Feng Yuxiang, Chiang Kai-shek's deputy in the military committee of the central government, Sun Yat-sen's son Sun Fo, chairman of parliament and chairman of the Sino-Soviet society, Sun Yat-sen's widow Sun Qingling, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Chinese army Bai Chongxi, a prominent political and social figure Shao Lizi, head of the propaganda department in the political department of the military committee and head of the military chancellery of Chiang Kai-shek He Yaozu, representative of Chongqing in the Xinjiang provincial government Zhang Yuanfu, prominent scientist Guo Mozhuo and others. With the direct participation of Panyushkin, our military advisers managed to convince Chiang Kai-shek to take more effective measures to disrupt the Japanese offensive, for which a plan for the defense of the city of Changtsi was developed. As a result of this operation, which lasted more than 20 days, the Japanese army lost about 30 thousand soldiers and officers. The success achieved during the defense of Changsha raised the morale of not only the Chinese leadership, but also the entire Chinese people.

At this time, the supply of Soviet weapons to China became especially important. Realizing that without modern weapons the Chinese army would not be able to continue resistance and would soon be forced to capitulate, Panyushkin sent a telegram to the Center in the spring of 1940, in which he recommended urgently providing additional arms assistance to China. And in the fall of 1940, when Panyushkin learned that Kong Xiangsi, He Yingqin, Wen Wenhao, Shao Lizi and other figures from Chiang Kai-shek’s inner circle were pessimistic about Soviet help, he invited them to dinner at the Soviet embassy and assured them that The USSR is ready to continue to assist China in the fight against Japan.

Another concern of the main station in Chongqing was the split that emerged in 1940 between the Kuomintang and the CPC. Therefore, the station staff used every opportunity to prevent the outbreak of a civil war and a breakdown in cooperation between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong. In particular, resident Panyushkin repeatedly met with Feng Yuxiang, Sun Fo, Zhang Yuanfu, Sun Qing Ling and, in confidential conversations, convinced them to make every effort to mitigate tensions between the Kuomintang and the CPC, improve Soviet-Chinese relations and expand the United National Front as a guarantor of success in the war with Japan. He had similar conversations with CCP representatives Bo Gu and Ye Jianying.

However, despite all the efforts of the Soviet side, in 1941 relations between the Kuomintang and the CPC resulted in open war. After an attack by Kuomintang troops on the 4th New Army of the CPC, as a result of which its commander Ye Ting was wounded and captured and its chief of staff was killed, Chiang Kai-shek announced its dissolution in January 1941. But even before the Kuomintang troops began their offensive against the 4th Army, the station, in agreement with Moscow, conveyed reliable information to one of the leaders of the CPC, Zhou Enlai, about Chiang Kai-shek’s intentions to demand that the Communists withdraw the army from the Shanghai area and a possible military operation against it. In addition, in order to avoid a sharp aggravation of relations between the Kuomintang and the CPC, the station strongly recommended that Zhou Enlai not consider Chiang Kai-shek the main culprit of the armed conflict, but consider He Yingqin as such, who must be exposed as a pro-Japanese element and an enemy of the United National Front of China.

The main station in Chongqing promptly informed Moscow about internal and foreign policy China, about the position of Chiang Kai-shek and his entourage in relation to the USSR, Japan, USA, England, France, the activities of Americans, British and Germans in China, about pro-German and pro-Japanese groups in the government and the Kuomintang, about the struggle between the Kuomintang and the CPC, as well as within the Kuomintang itself. In addition, the station obtained information about Germany’s military plans through its channels. Thus, in May 1941, data on the main directions of advance of fascist troops received from the Chinese military attaché in Berlin was sent to the Center.

It is interesting to note here that the INO NKVD during this period worked closely with the International Relations Department of the Comintern. An example of such cooperation is a letter from G. Dimitrov to L. Beria dated September 15, 1939:

“Dear comrade Beria, the visiting Chinese comrade Zhou Enlai brought with him three types of ciphers used by the Japanese army. These ciphers were captured by the 8th Army in battles with the Japanese.

Believing that the indicated ciphers may be of interest to you, I am sending you an attachment to this letter.

With friendly greetings, G. Dimitrov." After Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, the main task of the stations operating in China was to ignore the possibility of a Japanese attack on the USSR and the creation of a second front in the east. In this regard, the Center immediately demanded that the work of the residencies be restructured to serve the needs of the Great Patriotic War. For this it was proposed:

review the entire existing intelligence network and urgently transfer all suspicious and unhelpful informants to mothballing;

immediately begin an undercover and, if possible, personal study of employees of government agencies and large politicians, identifying those traits that could be used for recruitment;

cover in an exhaustive manner issues of fundamental importance, discarding trifles.

It should be noted here that the possibility of a Japanese attack was more than real. According to the Kantokuen plan, developed by the Japanese General Staff, the size of the Kwantung Army reached 700 thousand people by 1942, groups in Manchuria and Northern China were strengthened, and a new group of troops appeared in Korea. Operational plan It was envisaged that after the transfer of Soviet troops from the Far East to the Western Front, the capture of the Primorsky and Khabarovsk territories.

Information about Japan's military plans towards the USSR began to reach Moscow literally on the second day after the start of the war. Thus, on June 23, 1941, Marshal Feng Yuxiang informed Panyushkin that Japan intended to move against the USSR within a month. On June 27, General Bai Chongxi gave Panyushkin data not only on the number of Japanese divisions, but also on the number of Manchukuo troops ready to attack the USSR. Then the timing of the attack constantly changed. According to data received by the Chongqing station in the fall of 1941, the attack was associated with the capture of Leningrad and Moscow by fascist troops. However, after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, the Japanese General Staff again turned its attention to the “southern version” of military operations. Information about this decision was obtained in the spring of 1942 from many sources. So, in May, the already mentioned Pentkovsky, who had lived in Shanghai since 1936 and opened a law office there, reported on May 11, 1942 to his operator from the Shanghai station:

“The Smith you know, after a meeting with the head of the political department of the gendarme department who had returned from Japan on April 29, said that the issue of war between Japan and the Soviet Union was put on the back burner, since the Japanese were faced with the task of attacking Australia and India. In this regard, it is planned to open a number of Japanese companies in Shanghai, the organization of which was postponed indefinitely due to the expected military conflict with the USSR.”

And the next day, May 12, 1942, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, Lieutenant General Takekawa, presented a report in Tokyo, intercepted by Soviet intelligence, which contained the following conclusion: “Let there be a war of attrition for the USSR and Germany. At this time, Japan can profitably complete its affairs in the south."

However, even after this, tracking Japan’s military plans remained one of the main tasks of foreign intelligence residencies in China. Information about them came from various sources - from representatives of official Chinese authorities, communists, diplomats from third countries, and Russian emigrants. Important information on a confidential basis was received by the Chongqing residency from Y. Sverdlov’s brother Zinovy, adopted by A. M. Gorky under the name Peshkov, who at that time was the French Ambassador in Chongqing.

Lyushkov Genrikh Samoilovich

Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov was born in Odessa in the family of a tailor in 1900. Jew.

He studied at a state-owned primary school (1908-1915), taking evening general education courses. He worked as an assistant in an automobile accessories office.
Under the influence of his older brother, he takes part in underground anti-state activities.
Viyule 1917 joined the RSDLP(b).
In 1917 he joined the Red Guard in Odessa as a private.
Since 1918 in the Cheka.
In 1918-1919, while working underground under the leadership of a member of the Odessa Revolutionary Committee F.D. Kornyushin, he was arrested and escaped.
He served in the Red Army as a Red Army soldier, political cadet, and head of the political department.
Political instructor of the Shock Separate Brigade of the 14th Army.
In 1920 - deputy. Chairman of the Tiraspol Cheka, then in various positions in the Odessa Cheka, Kamenets-Podolsk branch of the GPU.
In 1924 - head of the Proskurovsky (now Khmelnitsky) district department of the OGPU, transferred to the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR in Kharkov.
By the early 1930s, he was engaged in industrial espionage in Germany.
In 1931 - head of the secret political department of the GPU of Ukraine.
In 1931 he was transferred to the central office of the OGPU. Conducted interrogations and approved the indictment in the case of the Russian National Party fabricated by the GPU.
In December 1934 he participated in the investigation of the murder of S. M. Kirov. He tried to counteract the attempts of N. I. Ezhov and A. V. Kosarev to control the investigation (later, having defected to the Japanese, he would declare that Kirov’s killer L. V. Nikolaev was a mentally ill person, and not a member of the terrorist Zinoviev organization, which was “inferred” consequence). But the future People's Commissar of the NKVD Lyushkova did not remember the disagreements of that time; on the contrary, he kept him among his favorites. Lyushkov also enjoyed the favor of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in 1934-1936 G. G. Yagoda: after returning from Leningrad, he prepared the most important orders for the NKVD and the most significant memos to the Party Central Committee (on behalf of Yagoda), and was used to monitor the situation in the Secret Service. Political department.
In 1935-1936, he participated in such high-profile investigations as the “Kremlin Case” and the case of the “Trotskyist-Zinoviev Center” (which formed the basis of the First Moscow Trial).
1936-1937 - Head of the NKVD for the Azov-Black Sea Territory (Rostov-on-Don). He led the deployment of great terror in the Black Sea region. He was a member of the regional troika of the NKVD. Including with his sanction, the murderer of Emperor Nicholas II A. G. Beloborodov was arrested
In 1937-1938 - NKVD plenipotentiary representative for the Far East. In connection with the beginning of Japan's military intervention against China, the situation in the region is attracting increased attention from the Soviet leadership
. On June 28, 1937, he received a brief briefing on his future duties personally from Stalin during a 15-minute audience.
Lyushkov’s arrival in Khabarovsk coincides with the beginning of the mass operation of the NKVD according to the notorious order No. 00447. On the spot, Lyushkov energetically gets to work and in parallel with mass repressions of the population (according to the preamble of the order, it was directed against “former criminals, kulaks and so-called anti-Soviet elements nesting in the countryside and city and infiltrating industry"), carries out a purge of the local NKVD. Under his leadership, about 40 employees of the local NKVD were arrested, including the former leader T.D. Deribas, the head of the Dalstroy camp trust E.P. Berzin. They were accused of creating a right-wing Trotskyist organization in the internal affairs bodies of the Far East. Lyushkov was the main organizer of the deportation of Koreans from the Far East, as well as repressions against other nations.
In December 1937, he was elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from the Far Eastern Territory, and came to Moscow for its first session in 1938. There, according to the recollections of M.P. Frinovsky, he noticed that he was being followed, which he reported to him with concern. However, the First Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD assured that Lyushkov did not arouse suspicion among him and Yezhov; on the contrary, they were taking measures to protect him from unfounded accusations. Lyushkov regarded this conversation as a refusal of a direct explanation.
Lyushkov was Yagoda’s highest-ranking nominee, who retained his position for a long time after his disgrace. Moreover, the new all-powerful People's Commissar of the NKVD in every possible way defended his name from compromising evidence. Yagoda was sentenced to death at the Third Moscow Trial, and in 1937-1938, the security officers under investigation often mentioned the name of Lyushkov along with the name of the former People's Commissar. In particular, the former head of the NKVD of the ZSFSR D.I. Lordkipanidze reported about his membership in a counter-revolutionary organization, but Yezhov did not bring the information to Stalin, but demanded that Frinovsky interrogate Yagoda and prove Lyushkov’s non-involvement. The testimony of Yagoda's deputy G.E. Prokofiev was corrected with the exception of the fragment about Lyushkov. Frinovsky expressed doubt about the need to protect Lyushkov, but Yezhov convinced his deputy.
After Lyushkov was sent to the Far East, incriminating evidence against him was received from L. G. Mironov (former head of the Counterintelligence Department of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR) and N. M. Bystrykh (brother of the deputy head of the Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia). Yezhov re-interrogated the first and forced him to retract his previous testimony, the second was “qualified” as a criminal, which made it possible to transfer his case to the police “troika” and remove the political component.
However, then the question of political distrust of Lyushkov was raised by Marshal V.K. Blucher. At the end of April 1938, I. M. Leplevsky, one of Lyushkov’s closest associates, was arrested, and a little later, Lyushkov’s deputy, M. A. Kagan, was summoned to Moscow for harboring his Trotskyist brother, which was already a serious alarming sign. On May 26, 1938, Lyushkov was relieved of his duties as head of the Far Eastern NKVD, allegedly in connection with the reorganization of the NKVD GUGB and appointment to the central apparatus. Yezhov informed him about this in a telegram, where he asked for his opinion on the transfer to Moscow. The text of the telegram revealed that in reality he was being recalled for arrest (no specific position was offered, only the desire to work in the center in general was found out, which was not asked about during appointments; for some reason, the selection of a successor was specifically mentioned). In June 1938, Frinovsky and L.Z. Mehlis arrived in the Far East to purge the leadership of the Pacific Fleet, border troops and the local NKVD.
An experienced security officer who knew the methods of the NKVD understood what this meant and decided to flee the country. Based on currently available archival data, it can be stated with a certain degree of confidence that Lyushkov prepared his escape in advance. On May 28, he telegraphed that he thanked for the trust shown and considered new job for the honor. But 2 weeks before that, he ordered his wife to take their daughter and go to one of the clinics Western Europe(documents confirming the need for treatment for my daughter were already ready for this trip by that time). Upon safe arrival, the wife was supposed to send Lyushkov a telegram containing the text “I am sending my kisses.” However, Lyushkov's development began already then - his wife was arrested and subsequently shot. The fate of the daughter is unknown; most likely she was sent to an orphanage under a different name.
On June 9, Lyushkov informed Deputy G.M. Osinin-Vinnitsky about his departure to the border Posyet to meet with a particularly important agent. On the night of June 13, he arrived at the location of the 59th border detachment, ostensibly to inspect posts and the border strip. Lyushkov was dressed in field uniform when receiving awards. Having ordered the head of the outpost to accompany him, he moved on foot to one of the sections of the border. Upon arrival, Lyushkov announced to the escort that he had a meeting on the “other side” with a particularly important Manchurian illegal agent, and since no one should know him by sight, he would go on alone, and the head of the outpost should go half a kilometer towards Soviet territory and wait for the conditional signal. Lyushkov left, and the head of the outpost did as ordered, but after waiting for him for more than two hours, he raised the alarm. The outpost was raised in arms, and more than 100 border guards combed the area until the morning. For more than a week, before news came from Japan, Lyushkov was considered missing, namely that he was kidnapped (killed) by the Japanese. Lyushkov had by that time crossed the border and on June 14 at approximately 5:30 near the city of Hunchun he surrendered to the Manchu border guards and asked for political asylum. Afterwards he was transported to Japan and collaborated with the Japanese military department.
G. F. Gorbach was appointed in his place, who carried out a purge of all Lyushkov’s proteges.
Lyushkov's escape was used as one of the reasons for the removal of N.I. Ezhov. According to the testimony of the former head of the Security Department of the GUGB NKVD I. Ya. Dagin, upon learning of Lyushkov’s escape, Yezhov cried and said: “Now I’m lost.” From Yezhov’s letter to Stalin: “I literally went crazy. I called Frinovsky and offered to go together and report to you. Then I said to Frinovsky: “Well, now we will be severely punished.” This was such an obvious and big failure of intelligence that, naturally, people don’t pat them on the back for such things.”
Lyushkov revealed to the Japanese all the information he knew about Stalin’s terror and about the methods of the NKVD in general. On July 13, 1938, in an interview with the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun, Lyushkov stated: " Until recently, I committed great crimes against the people, since I actively collaborated with Stalin in pursuing his policy of deception and terrorism. I really am a traitor. But I am a traitor only in relation to Stalin... These are the immediate reasons for my escape from the USSR, but the matter does not end there. There are also more important and fundamental reasons that prompted me to act this way. This is that I am convinced that Leninist principles have ceased to be the basis of party policy. For the first time I felt hesitation since the assassination of Kirov by Nikolaev at the end of 1934. This incident was fatal for the country as well as for the party. I was then in Leningrad. I was not only directly involved in the investigation of Kirov’s murder, but also actively took part in public trials and executions carried out after the Kirov case under the leadership of Yezhov. I was involved in the following cases: The case of the so-called Leningrad terrorist center in early 1935. The case of the terrorist center about the conspiracy against Stalin in the Kremlin in 1935. The case of the so-called Trotskyist-Zinoviev joint center in August 1936. Before the whole world I can certify with full responsibility that all these imaginary conspiracies never existed and they were all deliberately fabricated. Nikolaev certainly did not belong to Zinoviev’s group. He was an abnormal man who suffered from delusions of grandeur. He decided to die in order to go down in history as a hero. This is clear from his diary. At the trial, which took place in August 1936, accusations that the Trotskyists, through Olberg 1) were connected with the German Gestapo, accusations against Zinoviev and Kamenev of espionage, accusations that Zinoviev and Kamenev were connected with the so-called “right center” "through Tomsky, 2) Rykov and Bukharin, are completely fabricated. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Tomsky, Rykov, Bukharin and many others were executed as enemies of Stalin who opposed his destructive policies. Stalin used the opportunity presented by the Kirov affair to get rid of these people through the fabrication of vast anti-Stalin conspiracies, espionage trials and terrorist organizations. So Stalin got rid of political opponents and those who might become them in the future by all means possible. Stalin's diabolical methods led to the downfall of even very sophisticated and strong people. His events gave rise to many tragedies. This happened not only thanks to Stalin’s hysterical suspicion, but also on the basis of his firm determination to get rid of all Trotskyists and rightists who are political opponents of Stalin and could pose a political danger in the future...”
According to Lyushkov, sensational confessions were extracted from convicts under severe torture and with the threat of new torture. In support of his words, he published a suicide letter he had taken with him to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from the former assistant commander of the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army for the Air Force, A. Ya. Lapin, who committed suicide in a Khabarovsk prison. Revealing the secrets of Stalin's terror to the Japanese, Lyushkov did not hide his active participation in it.
Lyushkov was the highest-ranking defector from the NKVD. He worked in Tokyo and Dairen (Dalian) in the intelligence agencies of the Japanese General Staff (in the Bureau of East Asian Studies, advisor to the 2nd Department of the Kwantung Army Headquarters). Lyushkov conveyed to the Japanese extremely important information about the Soviet armed forces, in particular about the region of particular interest to them - the Far East. The Japanese received detailed information about the deployment of troops, the construction of defensive structures, fortresses and fortifications, etc. It was unexpected for them that the USSR had a fairly significant military superiority over the Japanese in the Far East. In addition, Lyushkov gave the Japanese detailed information about plans to deploy Soviet troops not only in the Far East, but also in Siberia and Ukraine, and revealed military radio codes. He handed over to the Japanese the most important agents of the NKVD in the Far East (in particular, former General V. Semenov). However, it is still not clear whether he conveyed all the military information known to him or concealed a number of the most important ones.
Here is what Koizumi Koichiro writes about the information that Lyushkov conveyed to Japanese intelligence: " The information that Lyushkov provided was extremely valuable to us. Information about the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East, their deployment, the construction of defensive structures, and the most important fortresses and fortifications fell into our hands. What struck us in the information we received from Lyushkov was that the troops that the Soviet Union could concentrate against Japan appeared to have overwhelming superiority. At that time, that is, at the end of June 1938, our forces in Korea and Manchuria, which we could use against the Soviet Union, numbered only 9 divisions... Based on the data received from Lyushkov, the fifth department of the General Staff came to the conclusion that The Soviet Union could use up to 28 rifle divisions against Japan under normal conditions, and if necessary, concentrate from 31 to 58 divisions... The ratio of tanks and aircraft also looked alarming. Against 2000 Soviet aircraft, Japan could field only 340 and against 1900 Soviet tanks- only 170... Before that, we believed that the Soviet and Japanese armed forces in the Far East were related to each other as three to one. However, the actual ratio turned out to be about five or even more to one. This made it virtually impossible to implement the previously drawn up plan of military operations against the USSR."…
Lyushkov proposed a plan to kill Stalin to the Japanese. They eagerly grabbed onto it. As Japanese researcher Hiyama writes, this was almost the only seriously prepared attempt to assassinate Stalin. Due to his duty as head of the NKVD department for the Azov-Black Sea region, Lyushkov was personally responsible for protecting the leader in Sochi. He knew that Stalin was treated in Matsesta. Lyushkov remembered the location of the building where Stalin took baths, the order and the security system, since he himself developed them. Lyushkov led a terrorist group of Russian emigrants, which the Japanese transferred to the Soviet-Turkish border in 1939. However, a Soviet agent was introduced into the terrorist group and the border crossing was disrupted.
In 1939, Lyushkov was sentenced to death in absentia in the USSR.
In July 1945, on the eve of the USSR's entry into the war with Japan, he was transferred from Tokyo to the location of the Japanese military mission in Dairen (China) to work in the interests of the Kwantung Army. On August 16, the command of the Kwantung Army announced surrender. On August 19, 1945, Lyushkov was invited to the head of the Dairen military mission, Yutaka Takeoka, who suggested that he commit suicide (apparently to hide the Japanese intelligence data known to Lyushkov from the Soviet Union). Lyushkov refused and was shot by Takeoka, his body was secretly cremated (after 3 days, Dairen was occupied by the Red Army). According to other sources, Lyushkov was brought to Dairen to be extradited to the USSR in exchange for the captured son of the former Prime Minister, Prince Konoe. Lyushkov, having learned about the impending extradition, attempted to escape and was strangled by Japanese officers

Commissioner of State Security 3rd rank (corresponding to the rank of lieutenant general).

State awards:

Order of Lenin (June 1937)

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Before the Second World War, Stalin was hunted by foreign intelligence services around the world: agents of Nazi Germany and former White Guards, saboteurs from Japan and white bandits - everyone wanted to see him dead.

The leader's suspicion grew, and large-scale purges began. Many close associates, considering themselves immune from prosecution, were at work until the last moment, but some fled the country, bearing the stigma of traitors.

Genrikh Lyushkov became the highest-ranking traitor of the USSR: when he crossed the border into Manchuria, he was Commissioner of State Security of the III rank and head of the NKVD Directorate for the Far Eastern Territory.

Genrikh Lyushkov was born in 1900 in Odessa, from the age of fifteen he worked in a store, under the influence of his older brother he became interested in the revolution and in 1917 became a member of the Bolshevik Party; During the Civil War, he participated in the underground, was arrested, and managed to escape.

In 1920, his career began: first the Cheka, then the GPU, from Tiraspol to Odessa, then to Kharkov. Ten years later he headed the Ukrainian secret political department of the GPU. He was distinguished by his zeal: he personally conducted interrogations and wrote indictments, for which he was transferred to the central office, where he acquired a patron - People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Genrikh Yagoda.

His career was brilliant: Lyushkov participated in the investigations of the murder of Kirov, the “Kremlin” case, the case of the “Anti-Soviet Trotskyist-Zinoviev Center” and everywhere showed himself in the best way and received two orders: Lenin and the Red Banner.

The most unusual work he was involved in was organizing Stalin’s security at the Matsesta hydrotherapy resort. Officially, the position was called “chief of the border service and NKVD of the Azov-Black Sea region,” but Lyushkov personally monitored the leader’s safety in the hydropathic clinic and eliminated many shortcomings, but he also knew the loopholes through which one could get to Stalin.

Heinrich spent the last two years in the Far East. He was appointed personally by Stalin and was given an audience with him before leaving. On the spot, Lyushkov arrested forty senior NKVD officers of the region; they were charged with organizing a “Trotskyist” underground and shot. Purges began in industry and in the countryside: 200,000 people were arrested, 7,000 were shot. It was Lyushkov who was involved in the resettlement of Koreans to Central Asia: Stalin believed that in case of war they would help the interventionists.

And then the star betrayed the hero: his patron Yagoda fell out of favor, Yezhov was appointed to the place of the People's Commissar of the NKVD, who first of all shot the top of the NKVD. In addition, Stalin was informed that among the top echelon military there was a secret underground whose goal was to destroy the party.

In 1938, Heinrich Lyushko came to the capital as a deputy and then noticed surveillance. He tried to find out her reasons, but they made him understand that no one would explain anything.

Apparently, there were other “bells” that frightened the head of the Far Eastern NKVD so much that he decided to escape. He himself explained his action by saying that he learned about Stalin’s order to arrest him.

To escape, Lyushkov arranged a security check of the Soviet-Manchurian border, went to the territory of the 59th detachment, explained to the boss that he had a “meeting with an agent from the other side” and asked to be left alone. The border guard did not dare to contradict, for which he paid: left alone, the NKVD officer crossed the border and surrendered to the Japanese.

Literally the next day, he was at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army and told the Japanese all the information he knew about border security, the deployment and armament of units, and that a group of Soviet intelligence officers was working in the rear of the Japanese, fortunately for Richard Sorge, he only knew pseudonyms.

For the Japanese, Lyushkov was a gift, because he was engaged in the protection of Stalin himself. The Japanese immediately began developing Operation Bear, the goal of which was to kill Stalin in Matsesta. Lyushkov knew that it was possible to get close to the leader at the moment when he was taking a bath in a hydropathic clinic: the leader lay alone for a long time in a radon bath.

You can get into the hospital through a drain: a large-diameter pipe was filled only halfway and led into a tank, from where you could crawl through a hatch into the pantry. It was planned to kill two stokers, then the killers were supposed to remove the guards and go into the room where Stalin was.

There was no question of staying alive - suicide bombers were recruited into the group. We prepared in earnest - a replica of the hospital was built at the Japanese intelligence base in Changchun, training took place on it, but the operation still failed. A group of saboteurs was unable to cross the border, running into machine-gun fire. Border guards killed three criminals, the rest were able to go back to Turkey.

Most likely, information about the group was provided to Stalin by the very same intelligence officers whom Lyushkov was never able to hand over to the Japanese.

Yesterday’s executioner himself changed his appearance and was going to campaign against the “Stalinist regime” through newspapers, consulted the Japanese, made forecasts and hoped that he would be given documents with which he could live in Southeast Asia. But the Japanese turned out to be pragmatists: as soon as it became clear that Soviet troops could enter Dairen (Dalian), counterintelligence officer Takeoka took Lyushkov out into the street and shot him in the chest, and another officer finished him off by shooting him in the head. The body of yesterday's executioner was cremated, and the urn with the ashes, according to custom, was taken to the nearest Buddhist temple.

But even if Lyushchkov managed to escape, he would hardly have been able to escape death: all Soviet agents had a directive to kill the traitor upon meeting.